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Product Warranty Liability
Judge Lee E. Skeel*
M UCH HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT the liability of a manufacturer
to a sub-purchaser for injuries caused by his products.
Actions against manufacturers, if based on the theory of negli-
gence, offer obvious difficulties of proof. Actions based on im-
plied or even express warranties often are defeated by lack of
contract privity.
There is however, a widespread misconception of the true
nature of warranty. This misconception must result in unjust
decisions in some cases. It therefore is desirable that the true
nature of warranty be analyzed. Such analysis may disclose the
proper relation of an express or implied warranty to the injury
suffered from defective or otherwise dangerous manufactured
products.
Let us take, for this purpose, an hypothetical hair-curling
"home treatment" product. Let us suppose injury suffered by a
user who relied on the warranties advertised by the product
manufacturer.
So many difficulties are inherent in the theory of implied
warranty that it seems wise to consider first the possibilities of
express warranty. After all, many products today are widely
advertised by the manufacturer. Is such advertising equivalent
to an express warranty? If it is, much of the problem may re-
solve itself.
For the sake of simplicity, this paper will omit discussion of
proof of actual negligence, merely touch on proof of implied war-
ranty, and concentrate on actual warranty in advertising and
labeling of products.
The usual petition will allege, in this respect, that the plain-
tiff was induced to purchase a product of the defendant's manu-
facture known as".... Home Permanent" as a result of the de-
fendant's representations made in advertisements seeking to in-
duce ultimate consumers to purchase and use its products, and
*Ohio Court of Appeals; President, Cleveland-Marshall Law School; etc.
[Editors' Note: Judge Skeel kindly consented, at the request of the
Editors, to write this discussion of his court's decision in a case closely
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demurrer to the theory here adopted, in, Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent
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particularly ". ... Home Permanent." It often also is alleged that
the said product is a drug as defined by the State's statutes,1
intended for use in the self-administration of a permanent hair
wave. The plaintiff usually alleges that after first testing her
hair, as directed by the defendant in printed instructions fur-
nished by the defendant for the safe use of its product, she pro-
ceeded, by following explicitly such instructions, to administer
to herself a "permanent wave." In doing so, she alleges, she
used exclusively the materials furnished by the defendant, which
materials were labeled "Very Gentle," and by reason of the
deleterious and harmful character of such materials furnished
by the defendant, known as ". . . . Home Permanent," when
they were applied to the hair of the plaintiff, they caused her
hair to "assume a cotton-like texture and became gummy; that
her hair refused to dry and that when the curlers furnished by
the defendant were attempted to be removed, her hair fell off
to within one half inch of her scalp."
It is then alleged that the defendant induced the plaintiff, by
express representation in advertisements directed to the attention
of the public and particularly to ultimate consumers, to purchase
its product from distributors or retailers, said representations
being to the effect that she could use the ".... . Home Permanent"
for the purpose intended and in the manner directed by the de-
fendant, with complete safety to her person. There often are
other allegations of other theories of action supplementing and
in support of the foregoing allegations of fact. The plaintiff then
usually prays damages for the injuries sustained as a result of
applying the " .... Home Permanent" as directed by the defend-
ant.
In addition, implied warranty also is pleaded as a third
theory.
The third cause of action adopts all of the facts set forth in
the first (negligence) and second (actual warranty) causes of
action, and alleges a breach of an implied warranty of its product
imposed by law as to its fitness for use and merchantability in
the following respects: 2
"1. That the Plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary, as
the intended consumer, of any contracts entered into by the
Defendant for the sale of its merchandise to the Plaintiff.
1 E.g., Ohio's Rev. Code, Sec. 3715.01.
2 See, for various other forms of allegations, works on Forms of Pleading.
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"2. That there was an implied warranty which ran with
the article from the Defendant to the consumer, the Plain-
tiff, that the article was fit for the use for which it was de-
signed, compounded and intended.
"3. That the Defendant, in placing its product upon the
market, intended that it eventually be sold to Plaintiff, or
other like consumers, and impliedly warranted the product
to Plaintiff, or other like consumers.
"4. That Defendant was conscious of the fact that Plain-
tiff, or others similarly induced by Defendant's advertising,
would be the ultimate purchasers, and knowing and intend-
ing that Plaintiff and other purchasers be those the Defend-
ant looked to for income, the Defendant impliedly contracted
with them, and thus, impliedly warranted its product to
them.
"5. That an implied warranty by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff arose as a matter of public policy, which public
policy is evidenced by the Pure Food and Drug Act of the
State of . . .,s which Act places manufacturers and sellers of
foods and drugs in a category separate and distinct from
that of the manufacturers and sellers of articles other than
foods and drugs."
The plaintiff then usually alleges facts constituting a breach
of such implied warranty and claims damages as a specific result
of such breach.
It is evident, in many denials of such requested relief that
the sole basis upon which the court sustains the defendants'
demurrers is on the ground that there is no privity between the
plaintiff as ultimate consumer and the defendant as manufacturer
of the product used by the plaintiff to her alleged injury, the
plaintiff having admittedly purchased defendant's product from
an independent retailer.
The facts pleaded in plaintiff's petition as above set forth,
for the purposes of the defendant's demurrer, must be con-
sidered as true.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the method of
merchandising products manufactured for use and consumption
by the individual has completely changed since the formative
period of the law of "Sales." Marketing has changed from the
period when the "common" artisan sold the products of his own
manufacture directly to the consumer, to the time of expansion
of markets through the direct efforts of middlemen and retailers,
who created the markets and served the consumer's needs. To-
3 Ohio's Pure Food and Drug Act is typical of those of many States.
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day, competing manufacturers, by direct advertising create, by
their own acts, the consumer market for their products. The
middleman or retailer now has become a delivery station to make
such goods available to the consumer. In the transition, even
the packaging is now done by the manufacturer. Today the
product is usually delivered to the consumer in sealed cans,
boxes or wrapping as prepared by the manufacturer. The Super
Market exemplifies -the process where the customer picks what
he wants from the shelves of the Super Market without even
the presence of a sales person, having been induced in his selec-
tion by the manufacturer's advertisement, and the first time he
has any contact with the retailer is in paying for his selections at
the cashier's desk.
The commonplace facts in this case, as described above, fit
completely into the foregoing pattern. The plaintiff demanded
of a retailer a ". . . . Home Permanent," which was received in a
sealed bottle packaged by the defendant, with which was also
received the defendant's printed directions for the "safe" use of
its product. The purchase was, as alleged by the petition, induced
by the defendant's representations.
By the early law, in transactions involving the sale of per-
sonal property, the obligation imposed upon the seller was only
to see to it that the goods agreed upon were made available to
the buyer. So far as their condition was concerned (except where
actual fraud was practiced), the law placed full responsibility
on the buyer to determine that question for himself, unless he
requested a representation as to their quality, which, if given,
was considered a warranty and as such was collateral to and
not part of the sales agreement. Caveat Emptor (Let the Buyer
Beware) was the basic theory of the law. Where a warranty was
demanded, if the transaction was a sale of identified property, the
property in the goods passed irrevocably to the buyer, even
though the warranty was untrue. The only action afforded the
buyer was an action in tort for damages for breach of the col-
lateral promise or representation. If the sale was of unspecified
goods, the warranty (collateral in nature or legal effect), was
treated as a condition which did not survive the acceptance of
the goods.
4
The action for breach of warranty was in its origin a pure
action in tort. The gradual change of the character of the action
4 1 Williston on Sales, pars. 195, 196 (rev. ed., 1948).
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to one in contract has come about because promises inducing
the sales, such as descriptive representations, were included in
the terms of the agreement. The form in which the inducement
was made did not change the legal meaning of "warranty" nor the
character of the obligation thus created, nor the manner or
form of the action in which a breach of warranty could be pur-
sued. A warranty is an obligation imposed by law, either because
of a representation which induces the sale or a promise within
the terms of the agreement of sale, and a breach of this obligation
imposed by law may be pursued either in an action in tort or in
contract.5
Williston, in his treatise on Sales,6 after stating that there
can be no doubt but that today the obligation of warranty is con-
ceived of as contractual, and that "there can be no doubt but
that the seller may expressly promise to be answerable for some
alleged quality of the articles sold, or that if he makes a promise
for good consideration, he enters into a contract" then goes on
to say that:
"This, however, does not either upon authority or reason ex-
haust the possibilities of express warranties. It should not
be the law, and by the weight of modern authority, it is not
the law that a seller who by positive affirmation induces a
buyer to enter into a bargain can escape from liability by
convincing the court that his affirmation was not an offer to
contract. A positive representation of fact is enough to ren-
der him liable. The distinction between warranty and repre-
sentation which is important in some branches of the law is
not appropriate here. The representation of fact which in-
duces a bargain is a warranty. (Italics added.)
"As an actual agreement to contract is not essential, the
obligation of the seller in such a case is one imposed by law as
distinguished from one voluntarily assumed. It may be
called an obligation either on a quasi-contract or a quasi-
tort, because remedies appropriate to contract and also to
tort have been applicable. That this is the character of the
seller's obligation was recognized by Blackstone, and that
this point of view has been lost sight of by many courts is no
doubt due to the fact that assumpsit became so generally the
remedy for the enforcement of a warranty. But even recently
an action of tort for warranty has been held by distinguished
courts to lie irrespective of any fraud on the part of the seller
or knowledge on his part that the representations constitut-
5 For other definitions see Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951); and,
"Words And Phrases."
6 1 Williston on Sales, 506 (par. 197) (rev. ed., 1948).
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1957
PRODUCT WARRANTY LIABILITY
ing the warranty were untrue. These authorities should
serve to show that the elements of a warranty are broader
than those of a contract."
Note 16, under this paragraph in Williston, in attempting to
clarify what Blackstone has had to say on this subject, states
that:
"Blackstone places his treatment of warranty under the head
of contracts which are implied by law: 'Which are such as
reason and justice dictate, and which therefore the law pre-
sumes that every man has contracted to perform; and, upon
this presumption, makes him answerable to such persons,
as suffer by his nonperformance.' In the last class of con-
tracts 'implied by reason and construction of law,' Black-
stone includes warranties: 'Also, if he that selleth anything
doth upon the sale warrant it to be good, the law annexes a
tacit contract to this warranty, that if it be not so, he shall
make compensation to the buyer; else it is an injury to good
faith, for which an action on the case will lie to recover
damages.' . .
The legal character of an express warranty as an obligation
imposed by law is clearly demonstrated as not necessarily con-
tractual when considering the parol evidence rule. The subject
is treated in cases where the sale was induced by verbal repre-
sentations or by the use of samples, and where the contract is
thereafter reduced to writing and no mention of the representa-
tions or samples that induced the sale is made, in the writing. 7
In concluding consideration of this question, Williston says
that:
"But if a written contract for goods is procured by represent-
ing that the goods described in the writing are like a sample
which is exhibited, it seems that parol evidence should be
admitted to prove these representations and that the seller
should be liable as warranting the truth of them. They are
not part of the contract, but the law should impose irrespec-
tive of the intention of the parties an obligation upon one
who induces a bargain by making such statements." 
The law is clear that an intent to warrant is not an essential
element in establishing a representation as constituting a war-
ranty. Any representation that has the effect of inducing the sale
comes within the foregoing defintion. A rule of law that would
distinguish between the rights of the parties to a sale where the
representation that induces the sale is collateral to and not
7 Ibid., p. 554 (par. 215).
8 Ibid., p. 558.
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included within the terms of the agreement, written or otherwise,
and a case where the same representation is a part of and in-
cluded within the terms of the sales agreement, certainly must
lead to utter confusion and is not to be recommended.
In an action between the buyer and seller, the courts of
Ohio have held that representations inducing the sale, but not
contained in a written contract, constitute a warranty enforce-
able against the seller.9 In Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor
Co.,10 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the syllabus state that:
"1. Where one is engaged in the manufacture and sale of
motor trucks, and the rebuilding of its used trucks, news-
paper ads or circulars touching rebuilt trucks, authorized
and published by such motor company to the general trade,
are competent evidence in behalf of the purchaser of any
such truck, who knows of such ad and relies upon the same,
unless it appear from the special contract signed by the
parties touching such sale that such special contract with-
drew or altered the representations made in such general ad.
"2. The language of a written order or contract of sale-
'All promises, verbal agreements, or agreements of any kind
pertaining to this purchase not specified herein, are hereby
expressly waived'-does not exempt such contract from the
force and effect of such general advertisement touching the
character and quality of a truck in process of rebuilding
when such contract was executed."
The fact that a representation inducing a sale of personal
property need not be a promise within the terms of a sale to
constitute a warranty is further exemplified by a consideration
of statements made previous to the bargain. Williston, in con-
sidering this question, comes to the conclusion that such state-
ments, if relied on to bring about or to consummate a sale of
personal property, constitute an express warranty."
The importance to the buyer of the right to bring an action
for breach of warranty, rather than an action for negligence in the
process of manufacture or in the use and selection of materials
used in the manufacture of the goods, must be kept clearly in
mind. If the buyer is compelled to contest the question of neg-
ligence in the process of manufacture with the manufacturer,
he will be at a great disadvantage unless the circumstances are
9 Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 0. S. 328, 140 N. E. 118, 28
A. L. R. 986 (1922).
10 Ibid.
11 1 Williston on Sales, pars. 209, 210 (rev. ed., 1948).
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such as to justify the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In the very
nature of things, evidence of negligence in the use of materials
or process of manufacture or inspection is within the exclusive
control of the manufacturer. In such case, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing fault on the part of the manufacturer-an
extremely difficult task.
The tort action permitted was (and in fact the only action for
breach of warranty possible under the early common law was)
not one requiring the plaintiff to establish fault in the process of
manufacture or in the use of materials as the basis of recovery.
Here the tort was concerned with the truth of the representation,
regardless of whether or not the seller knew his representation
to be untrue or that his product was negligently made. The fact
that the seller's representations were false, which resulted in
injury to the buyer in that he did not get the goods the seller
represented or pretended to sell, was clearly the basis of the tort
action. Damages, both direct and consequential, were recover-
able for the breach of the untrue representation. The action was
in the nature of one for misrepresentation, without the necessity
of proving intent to defraud or that the misstatement of fact was
knowingly made.
So we conclude that the obligation of "warranty" in the
sale of goods is one imposed by law, and one that need not neces-
sarily be based on contract. Then the remaining question is
whether the ultimate purchaser, having been induced to pur-
chase the goods by representations made by the manufacturer,
has a cause of action against the manufacturer, where the pur-
chase was made from an independent middleman or retailer
whose part in the transaction was limited to passing the goods on
from the manufacturer to the consumer, the article being selected
by the buyer without the middleman or retailer making repre-
sentations of any kind. It must be admitted that the earlier cases,
with a few exceptions based on the character of the goods, held
that such a cause of action did not exist, because of the absence
of privity between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer.
These cases completely overlook the fact that in many of them
the obligation created by a warranty is not necessarily contractual
in nature, but is one imposed by law.
The requirement of privity had its beginning in, and is still
founded on court decisions. At the time the rule was established,
the possibility of a warranty being a part of the sales agreement
was recognized. That is, it was recognized that it was not neces-
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol6/iss1/11
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sarily collateral in legal effect. The common law action in as-
sumpsit was then permitted to replace the tort proceeding in
trespass on the case. These early cases gave no indications in
fact that the manufacturer or creator of the goods made any
representations to induce the ultimate consumer to buy his
product. The selling was done by the retailer, and so, even though
the doctrine of privity was not an essential element in dealing
with a warranty imposed by law, its injection into such cases
was in accord with the facts. Williston, in an article,' 2 said that:
"If a man makes a statement in regard to a matter upon
which his hearers may reasonably suppose he has the means
of information, and that he is speaking with full knowledge,
and the statement is made as a part of a business transaction,
or to induce action from which the speaker expects to gain
an advantage, he should be held liable for his misstatement."
The foregoing quotation will be found in an article by, and is
adopted by, another leading writer, Professor James H. Spruill,
Jr.'3 He then proceeds to say,' 4 that:
"'What is important is that statements are made by one who
professes a reasonable certainty of knowledge, or whose
position makes accurate information peculiarly available
to him. Not only parties to the contract itself, but those in-
terested in and closely connected with the subject matter
who, because of such connection, are in a position to furnish
accurate information, or who purport to impart it, may well
be held to answer here for even innocent information.'
'There are situations in which action is commonly taken in
business negotiations upon the assumed existence of certain
facts. Business proceeds not upon the assumption that
representations are merely honestly and cautiously made,
but that they are true.' As applied to the problem under
consideration, this principle might be stated thus: One in, or
apparently in, a position to know, who, actuated by self-
interest, makes a representation intended to induce, and
reasonably inducing another to purchase or to use goods, is
an insurer of the truth of the matter so represented.
"If this analysis be followed and representation be re-
garded as warranty, then privity of contract will be seen in
a different perspective. It now becomes significant only inso-
far as it evidences a reasonable basis for reliance. And here,
in the principle of reliance, one can, perhaps, see the reason
12 Williston, Liability For Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HArv. L. R. 415,
437 (1911).
13 Spruill, Privity of Contract As a Requisite for Recovery On Warranty,
19 No. Car. L. R. 551 (1941).
14 Ibid., n. 13, at p. 557.
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for the conventional rule that recovery on warranty may
be had only where there is privity of contract. For, while
warranty is not contract, it would seem that until recently it
was only in situations where contract existed that one would
find that reasonable reliance which serves as the basis for
liability without fault. This statement is, of course, subject
to some exceptions; but the law has a tendency to fit the
average and ignore the exceptional situation."
He then goes on to say that: 15
"The Sale of Goods Act and the Uniform Sales Act were
drafted as codifications of the common law. For this reason
they reflect the production and merchandising pattern of the
past century rather than the present. They make no provi-
sion for warranty for the benefit of a subvendee; but it would
seem clear that neither act was intended to exclude such
liability. And where one is seeking to extend liability on
warranty for the benefit of a subvendee or donee, his great
difficulty is not the Sales Act but the fact that such relief has
been so frequently denied as to make the rule as to the
necessity of privity seem almost axiomatic. But, despite this
obstacle, the law is on the move."
The cases dealing with the requirement of privity in an ac-
tion for breach of warranty (express or implied) are in hopeless
conflict, with a growing tendency (for one reason or another) to
sidestep or ignore such requirement. The reason for permitting
recovery against the manufacturer by the sub-purchaser, when
such action is permitted, is based in some jurisdictions on the
character of the product. If the product is food, a drug, or some-
thing of an inherently dangerous character, recovery is permitted
without privity, on grounds of public policy, while the purchaser
of other chattels is not permitted such right. These distinctions
are hard to justify. What is in fact dangerous is highly prob-
lematical, depending on many considerations and surrounding
circumstances. In some jurisdictions the character of the injury
is the distinguishing feature. Here actions for personal injury
are permitted while actions for property damage are denied
without privity. It is hard to see why, on the grounds of public
policy, a slight personal injury should come within the excep-
tions, when a fire causing the destruction of one's home caused
by a defective electric blanket would not. And finally, the char-
acter of the action has been held to make the difference. If the
action is for breach of warranty, without privity, recovery in
some jurisdictions is denied. If it be based on negligence, that is
15 Ibid., n. 13, at p. 558.
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on a showing of fault, recovery by the ultimate consumer against
the manufacturer is now permitted in most jurisdictions. In the
case of MacPherson o. Buick Motor Co.,10 it was said that the
manufacturer, by putting a product on the market, assumes a
responsibility to the consumer, resting not only in contract but
upon the relation arising from his purchase and the possibility of
harm if proper care was not used in producing the goods. Before
this case, recovery in negligence cases, without privity, was not
permitted in many jurisdictions. Now such an action is almost
universally recognized.
Where recovery is permitted in a tort action, the basis of such
action must be considered. Simple negligence is the doing of an
unintentional act which violates a legal duty, causing injury to
another. Willful negligence constitutes the purposeful, unlawful
injury of another, or the purposeful doing of a dangerous act, or
one in violation of a duty imposed by law which in all reasonable
probability, to the knowledge of the wrongdoer, will result in
injury to another. Simple negligence is the direct opposite of an
injurious act willfully done, where the mind fully appreciates
the legal duty violated. Where the mind is innocent of any pur-
pose to injure another, or of knowledge of the fact that in all
probability injury will result from the act purposely done, simple
negligence results. This is true under two circumstances. First,
when the duty violated is one imposed by law without relation
to the breach of a representation in a voluntary transaction
created by agreement between the parties, and second, where the
breach is of a representation made to induce a sale of goods, said
representation being honestly made but being in fact untrue, to
the purchaser's damage.
The latter situation was the basis of the tort action recog-
nized and permitted at common law when a warranty was held
to be collateral to the sales agreement and the breach of the col-
lateral representation was required to be separately pursued.
The right to an action ex delictu for violation of the representa-
tions as to the quality of the goods, whether made collateral to
or in fact as part of the contract, has since continued. Such action
is not based on fault, but rather on the untruthfulness of the
representations honestly and innocently made.
Williston, quoting from an early case, says that: 17
16 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
17 1 Williston on Sales, 504 (par. 196), at n. 9 (rev. ed., 1948).
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".. . In Williamson vs. Allison, 2 East, 446, 450, Lord Ellen-
borough said: 'The warranty is the thing which deceives
the buyer who relies on it; and is thereby put off his guard.
Then if the warranty be the material averment, it is suf-
ficient to prove that broken to establish the deceit; and the
form of the action can not vary the proof in that respect...
Here then the plaintiff will be equally entitled to recover in
tort upon the same proof, by striking out the whole averment
of the scienter.'"
The point to be noted is that breach of the representation, which
was not necessarily a promise, was an obligation imposed by
law, and was the subject of a tort action by anyone rightfully
relying thereon to his damage. To hold that privity is necessary
under these circumstances, and not necessary where the negli-
gence was in the selection of materials or the process of manu-
facture, seems inconsistent.
The representation made by a manufacturer seeking to in-
duce the use of his product (where because of economic reasons
he must sell his product through a distributor or retailer) and
where such ultimate consumer relies on his representation as
the inducing cause of the purchase, amounts to a warranty in
favor of the ultimate consumer. Certainly the corner drug store
or other retailer of ". . . Permanent Wave" could have no use
for such product, nor would he be induced to buy it because of
representations of the advantage to be gained by its use, except
as the ultimate consumer may, in response to the manufacturer's
representation, demand the product. But the ... Home Perma-
nent Company, in inducing through direct advertising the use
of its product by the ultimate consumer, does so for its own
benefit. It is only secondarily interested in the retailer as a
channel through which the product is made available to the
public responding to the demand which its advertising creates.
The breach of the legal duty thus assumed may be without
fault but, if untrue, constitutes a tort as originally recognized
in the development of the law of warranty. Therefore it should
be redressed in an action for breach of warranty, just as in the
action permitted in the MacPherson case, supra, where the tort
of the manufacturer consisted of a failure to exercise due care,
under the circumstances, in the use and inspection of materials.
In an ever increasing number of cases now, in order to
avoid the thesis that a contractual relationship must be estab-
lished between the parties (where the sale is induced directly
by the manufacturer's representations), and to enforce a claim
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol6/iss1/11
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
of a breach of an express warranty brought by the ultimate con-
sumer, a number of legal principles or fictions are employed.
They may be enumerated as follows: The warranty runs with
the goods; or inures to the consumer's benefit; or the buyer is a
third party beneficiary; or, the goods are in sealed containers;
or the retailer or middleman acts as the agent of the manu-
facturer; or by reason of the public offer of the manufacturer to
the ultimate consumer, there is a representation of the quality
of the goods and their purchase is induced by such representa-
tion, spelling out a unilateral contract between the manufacturer
and the ultimate buyer.
If any one of these theories is adopted, a warranty between
the manufacturer or producer and the middleman or retailer
must be shown, except as to the last two theories suggested. As
to the theory of a unilateral contract, Reed Dickerson, a writer
on product liability, says that: '8
"From a policy standpoint, a direct legal connection be-
tween manufacturer and consumer is called for here as
fully as in the negligence situation dealt with in MacPherson
vs. Buick Motor Co.
"Liability imposed on this basis can be considered, with
equal appropriateness, as resting on quasi-promise or quasi-
tort (quasi-deceit). It can be imposed as if the manufacturer
had made a promise or representation directly to the con-
sumer and as if the consumer had accepted the supposed
promise or relied on the supposed representation. In either
case, the fiction transcends the actual contract made between
the manufacturer and his immediate vendee, and establishes
a clean-cut legal bond directly between manufacturer and
consumer. Privity of contract is no longer a consideration.
"Theories of third party beneficiaries, warranties run-
ning with the goods, and consumers' purchasing agents are
unsatisfactory not because they are based on fictions but
because they are based on inadequate fictions. (It is not
enough merely to allow the consumer crumbs from a table
set for the wholesaler.) Even courts that verbally accept
these approaches repudiate them in practice by ignoring
the existence and nature of the implied warranties, if any,
actually raised between the manufacturer and the whole-
saler.
"The simplest approach is to create a direct liability to
the consumer without fiction or analogy. Because the situa-
tion it deals with arises normally as a result of a sale by the
18 Dickerson, Products Liability And The Food Consumer, p. 104, par. 2.4,
Chap. II, "Manufacturers' and Wholesalers' Responsibility to Consumers
For Unwholesome Food" (1951).
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manufacturer, this kind of liability is likewise appropriately,
though not necessarily, incorporated into the miscegenous
household of 'warranty.' The characterization of its various
aspects as 'contract' or 'tort' could follow in due time with-
out making these processes necessary steps in the generation
of the obligation. Few courts have been so bold."
This view has received the approval of the Supreme Court of
Ohio. In the case of Kniess v. Armour & Co., 9 the principal
question had to do with the right of a non-resident corporate
defendant, the manufacturer of a food product, who had been
joined with a resident defendant, the local distributor of the
product, to have the action removed to Federal Court on the
ground of diversity of citizenship. In holding that the request
should have been granted, the court, in paragraphs one and two
of the syllabus, said:
"1. Where a citizen of Ohio and a citizen of another
state are joined as defendants, the cause should be removed
to the federal courts when a separable controversy exists
between the resident plaintiff and the nonresident defend-
ant.
"2. In an action against a packer and a retailer of food
for damages resulting from the sale of unwholesome food,
the liability of the packer is primary and that of the retailer
secondary, and under ordinary circumstances they cannot
be joined as joint tort-feasors."
In defining the character of actions that could be maintained
against both the retailer and the manufacturer of food, the court
said: 20
"We, therefore, must conclude that the theory upon which
an action can be maintained against Burmeister as a re-
tailer for the sale of unwholesome food can be predicated
on either contract or tort, and that the adoption of Section
12760, General Code, has not changed the underlying theory
of the cause of action.
"What is, however, the theory upon which a manufacturer
or packer is held liable to the ultimate consumer of un-
wholesome food sold through a retailer? Some few courts
have said that there was an implied warranty of wholesome-
ness and consequently there was privity of contract. Others
have said that if the negligence of the manufacturer in pre-
paring the food causes damage to the ultimate consumer,
that fact could reasonably be anticipated and privity of con-
'9 134 0. S. 432, 17 N. E. 2d 734 (1938).
20 Ibid., 134 0. S. at p. 442.
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tract is not essential. Some have allowed a recovery either
upon the theory of negligence or contract, but not both. The
sale most frequently has been likened to that of poisonous
drugs and injurious patent medicines, where the careful
compounding is demanded by public policy. See 17 A. L. R.
672; 39 A. L. R. 992; 63 A. L. R. 344; 105 A. L. R. 1502; 111
A. L. R. 1239.
"It seems to the court that of all of these theories, the
one last mentioned is the most persuasive. Public policy
demands that care and caution should be exacted from
manufacturers of food who sell for the purposes of general
disposition and sale to the general public. In other words
the manufacturer or packer warrants to the public generally
that the goods produced are fit for human consumption. See
42 Harvard Law Rev. 414."
The requirement of privity as the basis for an action for
breach of an express warranty in the sale of personal property
has become the subject of many articles and treatises in law
reviews and other legal publications. 21 Only a few of many
authoritative writings are cited here. Many are cited in the lead-
ing cases which depart from the'requirement of privity. Para-
graph 244a of Williston on Sales, supra,22 which appears for the
first time in the latest edition (1948), indicates the trend and
provides:
"If it be granted that a subpurchaser as such is not entitled
to the benefit of a warranty given to the original buyer, it
yet may be asked may not the original seller by means of
labels, advertisements or otherwise bind himself by a war-
ranty to anyone who thereafter buys his goods. Certainly
manufacturers often make representations to the public,
which if made directly to an immediate buyer would amount
to warranties. The difficulty which most courts seem to feel
in allowing the subpurchaser a remedy is based on the as-
sumption that the liability of a warrantor is contractual, and,
therefore, can only run directly between a purchaser and
his immediate seller. This argument does not seem impres-
sive as an original question. A warranty is in many cases
imposed by law not in accordance with the intention of the
parties; and in its origin was enforced in an action sounding
21 1 Williston on Sales (Rev. ed., 1948) added a new Par. 244a on this point.
See also, Dickerson reference above, n. 18, at Chap. II. Also, Spruill reference
above, n. 13. Also, Note, Liability of the Manufacturer to the Ultimate
Consumer for Breach of Warranty in Ohio, 7 West. Res. L. R. 94 (1951).
Also, Green, Innocent Misrepresentations, 19 Va. L. R. 242 (1933). Also,
Harper & McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation, 22 Minn.
L. R. 939 (1938). Also, Miller, Liability of Manufacturer for Harm Done
By Product, 3 Syracuse L. R. 106 (1952).
22 Williston, supra, n. 21.
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in tort, based on the plaintiff's reliance on deceitful appear-
ances or representations, rather than on a promise, and
where forms of action are still differentiated, an action of
tort is generally allowed even at the present day. It must be
admitted, however, that most courts might require the exist-
ence of a direct contractual relation. This relation, however,
might under some circumstances exist between manufac-
turer and subpurchaser and conceivably even between the
manufacturer and a consumer who is neither a purchaser
nor subpurchaser. A general offer like an offer of reward
may be made to any who will buy; and though this does
not often happen, illustrations may be found in the sale of
well-known articles such as 'Holeproof' hosiery and Ingersoll
watches."
A case on which defendants often rely to defeat such a theory
of action is Wood v. The General Electric Co. 23 The plaintiff
there had purchased an electric blanket, which set fire to his
house after less than two months of use. The petition contained
two causes of action, one for a breach of implied warranty, the
other for the negligent manufacture of the blanket and failure to
inspect and for failure to warn plaintiff of its dangerous con-
dition. The court held, in the second paragraph of the syllabus:
"2. Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous
article may recover from its manufacturer for negligence,
in the making and furnishing of the article, causing harm
to the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect
therein, no action may be maintained against a manufac-
turer for injury, based upon implied warranty of fitness of
the article so furnished."
From the statement of facts as found in the Wood case,24
that case is to be distinguished from the hypothetical situation
here discussed, because of the failure to allege or attempt to
prove that the purchaser of the blanket was induced to buy it
by the direct representations of the General Electric Company.
Nor was the issue of an express warranty presented. It should
also be noted that the question of implied warranty was ap-
parently not specifically called to the attention of the reviewing
court by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' claim of error was that
the charge on contributory negligence was not confined to the
cause of action based on negligence. The Ohio Supreme Court
said: 25
23 159 0. S. 273, 112 N. E. 2d 8 (1953).
24 Ibid., at 159 0. S. p. 275.
25 Ibid., at 159 0. S. p. 278.
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"There is another reason why the charge of the court on
contributory negligence was not prejudicial to the plaintiffs
as it related to the subject of implied warranty. The blanket
in question was purchased in the original package from an
independent dealer. To support an implied warranty there
must be contractual privity between the seller and buyer."
The case of Krupar v. Procter & Gamble Co.,26 is also
cited, but the question of warranty was found by the court not
to be an issue in that case.
The case of Jordon v. Brouwer,27 often is also cited. This
case was one in which it was alleged that "antifreeze," because
of its dangerous chemical content, damaged the radiator of plain-
tiff's car. The plaintiff alleged an express warranty through
advertising on the labels of the cans used by the defendant to
deliver its product to the purchaser. The action was brought by
the ultimate consumer (who purchased the antifreeze from a
retailer), against the manufacturer. There is no doubt that the
majority of the court held that the plaintiff could not maintain
an action based on a claim of express or implied warranty, where
privilty could not be established between the parties. However,
the dissenting opinion is far more persuasive under modem
trends.
Of the many cases cited by modern authorities as repre-
senting the trend of the law on the subject of privity, the case
of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 28 best demonstrates this trend. The
plaintiff's action was against both the dealer and manufacturer
of Ford automobiles for damages sustained by shattered glass,
which destroyed one of plaintiff's eyes when the windshield was
struck by a pebble thrown from the road by a passing automo-
bile. The dealer was dismissed from the case. The case against
Ford was based on its published representation that the glass
used in the windshield was so made that it would not fly apart
or shatter under the hardest impact. The trial court dismissed
the action against Ford because there was no privity of contract
between Ford and the plaintiff, he having purchased the car
from an independent dealer.
In the first paragraph of the headnotes of the American Law
Reports, supra,29 it is said:
26 160 0. S. 489, 117 N. E. 2d 7 (1954).
27 86 0. App. 505, 93 N. E. 2d 49 (1949).
28 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409, 88 A. L. R. 521 (1932).
29 Ibid., n. 28,
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"An automobile manufacturer may, notwithstanding there
was no privity of contract between them, be liable to a pur-
chaser of a car from a dealer for injuries to such purchaser
by flying glass when a pebble thrown by a passing car struck
the windshield where the manufacturer in its advertising
represented that the glass in the windshield was so made
that it would not fly or shatter under the hardest impact."
And in the A. L. R. report30 the court said:
"The vital principle present in the case of Mazetti vs. Armour
& Co. (75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633, 634) supra, confronts us in
the case at bar. In the case cited the court recognized the
right of a purchaser to a remedy against the manufacturer
because of damages suffered by reason of a failure of goods
to comply with the manufacturer's representations as to the
existence of qualities which they did not in fact possess,
when the absence of such qualities was not readily dis-
coverable, even though there was no privity of contract
between the purchaser and the manufacturer.
"Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated,
vast changes have taken place in the economic structures of
the English speaking peoples. Methods of doing business
have undergone a great transition. Radio, bill-boards, and
the products of the printing press have become the means
of creating a large part of the demand that causes goods to
depart from factories to the ultimate consumer. It would
be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit manufac-
turers of goods to create a demand for their products by
representing that they possess qualities which they, in fact,
do not possess, and then, because there is no privity of con-
tract existing between the consumer and the manufacturer,
deny the consumer the right to recover if damages result
from the absence of those qualities, when such absence is
not readily noticeable.
"'An exception to a rule will be declared by courts when
the case is not an isolated instance, but general in its
character, and the existing rule does not square with justice.
Under such circumstances a court will, if free from the
restraint of some statute, declare a rule that will meet the
full intendment of the law.' Mazetti vs. Armour & Co.,
supra."
In the case of Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,21 the action
was between a cotton planter as plaintiff (who came to use the
defendant's insecticide through a cooperative association) and
the manufacturer of the insecticide. It was charged that the
insecticide, when sprayed on plaintiff's cotton crop, caused
30 At p. 525.
31 42 Calif. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954).
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damage to the crop. Many questions were presented involving
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, warranties under the statutes
of California, disclaimer of warranty printed on labels, etc. The
court32 discussed the need of privity in claiming a breach of
express or implied warranty, and said: 3
"Another possible exception to the general rule is found in
a few cases where the purchaser of a product relied on
representations made by the manufacturer in labels or ad-
vertising material, and recovery from the manufacturer was
allowed on the theory of express warranty without a show-
ing of privity. (See Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 933,
936-937 (197 P. 2d 854) (soap package contained printed
guarantee of quality); Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co.,
290 Mich. 683 (288 N. W. 309, 312-313) (automobile manu-
facturer represented top of car to be made of seamless
steel); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456 (12 P. 2d
409, 15 P. 2d 1118, 88 A. L. R. 521) (automobile manufac-
turer represented windshield to be nonshatterable glass);
Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N. C. 542 (8 S. E. 2d 813,
815-816) (representation on label that insecticide was non-
poisonous to humans); Prosser on Torts (1941) 688-693; 1
Williston on Sales (Rev. Ed. 1948) 648-650; Feezer, 'Manu-
facturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by His Product,' 37
Mich. L. Rev. 1; Jeanblanc, 'Manufacturer's Liability to
Persons Other than Their Immediate Vendees,' 24 Va. L.
Rev. 134 (146-155).) Neither exception is applicable here.
The facts of the present case do not come within the ex-
ception relating to foodstuffs, and the other exception, where
representations are made by means of labels or advertise-
ments, is applicable only to express warranties. As we have
seen, the instruction involved here dealt only with implied
warranties. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to
instruct that privity was not required.
"The question of whether plaintiffs could recover be-
cause of breach of an express warranty was apparently not
presented to the jury, but, since there may be a new trial,
it is appropriate to point out that the record contains suffi-
cient evidence to show that there were representations which
could form the basis of an express warranty."
In the case of Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,3 4 it was held
that privity was unnecessary in cases involving foodstuffs and in
a few cases where the buyer relied on the manufacturer's repre-
sentations in advertisements or labels. And in Worley v. Procter
32 42 Calif. 2d at p. 695.
33 Ibid., at p. 696.
34 135 Calif. App. 2d 653, 288 P. 2d 75 (1955).
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& Gamble Mfg. Co.,3 5 it was held that in the case of food prod-
ucts sold in original packages and other articles, if they were
dangerous to life if defective, representations directed to the
ultimate consumer by the manufacturer being inducements to
the buyer must be considered as warranties implied by law.
This results in imposing liability for injuries to the consumer,
irrespective of any contractual obligation on the vendor.,36
Quoting again from Spruill's leading article, supra:3 7
"It has been said of warranty that 'A more notable example
of legal miscegenation could hardly be cited.' It originated
in tort as a species of relief for misrepresentation. Later
there was added to this concept of warranty another which
was consensual in nature. In time special assumpsit rather
than trespass in the case for deceit became the normal
remedy for breach of warranty and men came to think of
warranty as contract. But the old remained along with the
new. Consequently warranty is neither tort nor contract.
It is both." (Emphasis added.)
The basis of an express warranty is first a representation as
to the quality of the goods, followed by reliance thereon as an
inducement for entering into a sales agreement for the purchase
of personal property. Where such representation is made and
relied upon, an express warranty results. This is not to say that
a manufacturer who does not make such public representations
as to induce the sale of his product is to be held liable to the
ultimate consumer without privity upon any other basis than
negligence in the process of manufacture or use of materials.
But an artificial rule of law of doubtful parentage should not
protect one from liability, where his representations are the in-
ducing cause of a sale in which he is undoubtedly benefited.
From the foregoing authorities it is clear that the absence
of privity cannot be pleaded as a bar to liability in all cases
where the ultimate consumer brings an action against the manu-
facturer for damages suffered in the use of his product. The
basic question underlying liability is whether or not the manu-
facturer induced the sale of his goods by direct representations
of quality which were not true, and the purchaser relied on such
representations to his damage.
35 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S. W. 2d 532 (1953).
36 See also, United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Waco, 130 Tex. :26, 108
S. W. 2d 432 (1937); and Graham v. Watts & Sons, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S. W. 2d
845 (1931).
37 At n. 13, above, p. 552 therein.
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Where a manufacturer induces the purchase of his products
by an ultimate consumer by representations as to their quality,
purposes and uses, which are relied on by the purchaser, and
where such representations are untrue, so that the purchaser is
damaged in using the product for the purpose as advertised, the
common law theory of express warranty should be available to
the purchaser regardless of privity. If this is not true, then where
the dealer sells at the request of the buyer without express
warranty (the buyer having been induced to buy through the
manufacturer's representations) and the law of the case of Mc-
Murray v. Vaughn's Seed Store,38 (set forth below) is in point
on the facts, and the law of the case of Wood v. General Electric
Co., supra,39 is also in point, then even though the plaintiff was
injured because the product did not square with the representa-
tions that induced the sale, he would be without a remedy if
unable to prove fault in the process of manufacture under the
case law of Ohio. The McMurray case40 provides that:
"4. Where a dealer sells an article of merchandise in the
original package as it comes from the manufacturer, and
the customer buys it knowing there has been no inspection
by the dealer, there is no implied warranty, and, in the
absence of an express warranty or representation, such
dealer is not liable to the purchaser for damages caused by
any deleterious substance in such merchandise the presence
of which he had no knowledge."
Wood v. The General Electric Company, supra, says: 41
"2. Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous
article may recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in
the making and furnishing of the article, causing harm to
the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect there-
in, no action may be maintained against a manufacturer for
injury, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the article
so furnished."
In our hypothetical case, the facts pleaded are that the
plaintiff purchased defendant's ". . . . Home Permanent" from
an independent dealer on the faith of representations published
by the defendant. The defendant's product was delivered
through the independent dealer in a sealed container. The rep-
resentations of the defendant were made directly to the ultimate
38 117 0. S. 236, 157 N. E. 567 (1927), par. 4 of the syllabus. See below,
the McMurray case quotation.
39 N. 23, above.
40 N. 38, above.
41 N. 23, above, in Par. 2 of the syllabus.
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consumer, that ...... Home Permanent" could be used, if direc-
tions were followed, in complete safety to the user. The plain-
tiff did follow the defendant's directions for use, with the result
that she lost her hair to within one-half inch of her scalp. These
facts, as pleaded, then are sufficient to state a cause of action for
breach of an express warranty against the defendant.
Our conclusion as to implied warranty as a cause of action
would follow the same logic, were it not for the strong effect of
the second paragraph of the syllabus of Wood v. The General
Electric Company, supra.42 Because of the law there clearly
determined, a breach of an implied warranty of fitness or mer-
chantability cannot be redressed except where there is privity
between the parties, which conclusion we are bound to follow.
Actually, the Wood case dealt with a chattel. Our hypo-
thetical case deals with a cosmetic or personal-application prod-
uct. One easily could distinguish the Wood case, logically speak-
ing. But it seems far more important to develop the "actual
representation" principle, and I confine myself to that point in
order to avoid possible confusion of the two quite dissimilar ap-
proaches to the problem.
It is sufficient, in practical terms, to set up a rule of simple
strength: that a manufacturer's advertised or label-printed
representation is an actual warranty in the case of packaged,
widely advertised products, at least; and that this warranty is
binding if reasonably relied upon by the ultimate consumer
or user.*
42 At n. 41.
* [Editor's Note: This, in effect, is the rule laid down in the case on which
the foregoing discussion is based. In that case, the author, Judge Skeel,
with Kovachy, P. J. and Hurd, J., concurring, so ruled on a defendant's
demurrer to the theory here discussed. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent
Co., Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, 8th Distr., Opinion dated
Jan. 16, 1957.
Judge Skeel kindly consented to write the foregoing discussion at the
request of the Editors of this law review.]
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